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Land and politics in independent Ireland, 1923-48: 
the case for reappraisal 
T 
he land question from the mid-Victorian period to around 1903 looms large 
in Irish historiography. This is hardly surprising given the fact that, while it 
was immensely important in its own right, it could not be disentangled from the 
wider political developments of the time that saw the land and national questions 
merge.1 However, with the exception of recent work by Professor David Seth 
Jones, the land question in post-independence Ireland has been largely 
overlooked.2 There seems, in fact, to be a general assumption among political, 
social and economic historians that there was no land question after 1922, that the 
land act of the following year defused all potential for future agrarian unrest by 
completing the transfer of ownership from landlords to tenants.3 Nowhere is this 
hypothesis more clearly pronounced than in J. J. Lee's Ireland 1912-1985: 
politics and society (1989), in which the author contends that at independence 
There was no longer a viable landlord system. Most Irish farmers became the effective 
owners of their holdings before 1921. The 1923 Land Act permitted the remaining tenants 
to purchase their holdings quickly, but the major changes in land ownership occurred 
before independence, contrary to frequent eastern European experience. The government 
1 Major works in which the land question plays the dominant role include Paul Bew, Land 
and the national question in Ireland, 1858-82 (Dublin, 1978); Philip Bull, Land, politics and 
nationalism: a study of the Irish land question (Dublin, 1996); Samuel Clark, Social origins 
of the Irish land war (Princeton, 1979); J. S. Donnelly, jr, The land and the people of 
nineteenth-century Cork: the rural economy and the land question (London, 1975); 
Laurence Geary, The Plan of Campaign, 1886-91 (Cork, 1985); David Seth Jones, Graziers, 
land reform and political conflict in Ireland (Washington, D.C., 1995); D. E. Jordan, Land 
and popular politics in Ireland: County Mayo from the plantation to the land war 
(Cambridge, 1994); T. W. Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution, 1846-82 (Oxford, 1981); 
B. L. Solow, The land question and the Irish economy, 1870-1903 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1971); W. E. Vaughan, Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland (Oxford, 1994). 
2 David Seth Jones, 'Divisions within the Irish government over land distribution policy, 
1940-70' in fire-Ireland, xxxvi (2001), pp 83-109. 
3 See, for example, E S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (London, 1971), p. 606; 
John A. Murphy, Ireland in the twentieth century (Dublin, 1975), p. 65; Ronan Fanning, 
Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p. 73; J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: politics and 
society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 71; Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998: politics and war 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 283; David Fitzpatrick, The two Irelands, 1912--1939 (Oxford, 1998), 
p. 240. See also R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London, 1988); Dermot Keogh, 
Twentieth-century Ireland: nation and state (Dublin, 1994); Cormac 6 Grida, Ireland: a 
new economic history, 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994); idem, A rocky road: the Irish economy 
since the 1920s (Manchester, 1997); Charles Townshend, Ireland: the twentieth-century 
(London, 1999); Mike Cronin and J. M. Regan (eds), Ireland: the politics of 
independence, 1922-49 (Basingstoke, 2000). 
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was not therefore exposed to the temptation to manipulate land reform extensively for 
political purposes, which might have spawned massive corruption and provoked 
widespread grievance. Such limited land re-distribution as occurred continued to be 
channelled through the safer conduits of the Land Commission. Communities were not 
generally rent asunder by rival claims to land.4 
The primary aim of this article is to suggest that such traditional assumptions 
are fundamentally flawed. By focusing upon the administrative periods of 
Cumann na nGaedheal (1923-32) and Fianna Fail (1932-48), it argues the case 
that there is a need to reassess the centrality of the land question to both national 
and local politics after independence. 
This article also suggests that it is important to reassess the significance of the 
Land Commission after 1923 to Irish rural life. Needless to say, such a 
reassessment would be greatly facilitated by the opening of the Irish Land 
Commission records to the public. In fact more open access to these records 
(estimated to run to around 11 million in total) would greatly enhance primary 
research into all aspects of the social, economic, cultural and, indeed, political 
history of Ireland since the establishment of the commission under the terms of 
the 1881 land act. (These records include title-deeds some of which date back to 
at least the fifteenth century, maps and related papers, records of Land 
Commission proceedings, correspondence, inspectors' reports on individual 
holdings and families, as well as the records generated by the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners who conducted the disposal of church lands after 
disestablishment in 1869 and the records of the Congested Districts Board set up 
under the 1891 land act and disbanded in 1923 which elucidate the social, 
economic and cultural circumstances of people living along the western 
seaboard.) At present there remains a difficulty in accessing these records, as they 
are still deemed to be 'working records'5 and, therefore, covered by section 8 (2) 
of the 1986 National Archives Act that effectively excludes from the terms of the 
act records over thirty years old that continue to be working records or which 
contain information that might cause 'distress or danger to living persons on the 
grounds that they contain information about individuals, or would or might be 
likely to lead to damages for defamation'.6 
However, as this article is primarily concerned with land division and what can 
perhaps be best described as the lost politics of independent Ireland, it should be 
emphasised that access to the Land Commission records was not deemed 
essential to its completion. While the Land Commission records are a veritable 
goldmine in their own right, their inaccessibility should not be regarded as 
precluding research on the whole issue of the land question after 1922. 
Fortunately, there is a rich vein of other records presently in the public domain 
that, for the purposes of the present study, is more than ample compensation. 
4 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985, p. 71. 
5 Text of parliamentary question no. 84, ref. 4180/03, and reply from Minister for 
Agriculture, 13 Feb. 2003, forwarded to the present author by Ms Deirdre Fennell, private 
secretary to John Bruton, T.D. 
6 An act to provide for the establishment of a body to be known as the National Archives 
and for other connected matters (11/1986) (18 May 1986). 
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In July 1922 a government spokesman wrote that 'The completion of the land 
acts is the most earnest concern of the Government of Ireland. As soon as internal 
affairs are sufficiently stable to warrant a step forward, measures will be taken to 
settle finally the land question." However, by January 1923, after six further 
months of civil war, it was recognised within government circles that, in fact, the 
final settlement of the land question through legislation could possibly be a major 
step towards the restoration of law and order.8 Given the historical precedents 
since the 1880s of defusing agrarianism with land legislation, this response was 
perhaps predictable in light of the dramatic growth in agrarian crime during 1922 
that was, rightly or wrongly, predominantly associated in the popular perception 
with the activities of the anti-treaty faction, who were accused of rallying support 
in the localities by exploiting traditionally emotive agrarian grievances. This was 
particularly true of the west, from where Colonel Maurice Moore wrote a 
revealing letter to the Minister for Defence in May 1922: 
The anti-Treaty politicians and I.R.A. finding themselves in a hopeless minority, have 
adopted a policy very dangerous to the country and to the present ministry, though it has 
not been openly avowed. They are now making a bid for support hrough an agrarian 
movement.9 
The following December, Patrick Hogan, the influential Minister for 
Agriculture, told his parliamentary colleagues that he felt the anti-treatyites were 
attempting to make up lost ground by becoming involved in widespread land- 
grabbing: 'It would have the advantage of being much more popular, in fact quite 
in the best traditions. The "land for the people" is almost as respectable an 
objective as the "republic" and would make a much wider appeal.'10 
Hogan had his finger very firmly on the rural pulse. While land and political 
issues had traditionally been inextricably entwined in Ireland, it was arguably 
land issues that had provided the momentum to political movements rather than 
vice versa. For the majority of people living in rural Ireland, access to land 
continued to be a possibly more desirable commodity than independence, and the 
Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 had made no provision for the completion of land 
purchase or the redistribution of large untenanted estates. Since 1917 agrarianism 
had arguably been fuelled by revolutionary activity; but it was by no means 
dependent upon it. Rural social conditions remained such that another phase of 
agrarianism was probably imminent even if a home rule parliament had been put 
in place. The unwillingness of some landlords to sell their tenanted estates and 
then the suspension of land purchase during the First World War meant that there 
remained 114,000 unpurchased tenants. Of perhaps more concern were the 
295,566 uneconomic occupiers of one to thirty acres (plus a further 112,787 
occupiers of less than one acre) who looked jealously upon the 33,400 holdings 
of over 100 acres. These large holdings comprised in total around 7.3 million 
7 J. M. Duff to - McGann, 18 July 1922 (N.A.I., DT S2981). 
8 Ddil tireann deb., ii, 592 (5 Jan. 1923). 
9 Maurice Moore to the Minister for Defence, 9 May 1922 (Military Archives, Dublin 
(henceforth M.A.), A/3126). 
'o [Patrick Hogan], 'Seizures of land' (copy memo), 22 Dec. 1922 (N.A.I., DT S1943). 
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acres, approximately one-third of the country's total acreage and well above that 
proportion in terms of its arable acreage." 
The findings of the land purchase sub-committee of the Irish Convention of 
1917 and the subsequent drafting of the 1920 land bill with its compulsory 
acquisition terms, even if they were limited, were strongly suggestive of the 
perceived need to settle the Irish land question once and for all.12 But both the 
convention and the land bill were doomed to failure. From 1917 grievances gave 
rise to an increase in agrarian crime that flourished in the conditions created for 
it by the Anglo-Irish conflict.13 From 1920 land-grabbing became a major and 
worrying feature of rural society; thousands of unpurchased tenants struck 
against the payment of rents, while even purchased tenants availed of the 
opportunity not to pay their Land Commission annuities, most taking advantage 
of the social chaos that made it virtually impossible to collect rents or resort to 
the courts for their enforced payment.14 In April 1923 landlord representatives 
went so far as to claim that only on about 10-15 per cent of tenanted estates had 
rents been paid up to date.'5 Thus the involvement of the anti-treatyites in 
agrarianism from 1922, that so perturbed first the Provisional and then the Free 
State governments, merely exacerbated an existing situation. 
From December 1922 the Free State government adopted a number of 
approaches to deal with agrarian disorder. In that month Hogan proposed that the 
army should take 'immediate and drastic action against people who [had] seized 
other people's land'. In February 1923 the Minister for Defence, acting on 
Hogan's suggestion, established a Special Infantry Corps specifically to tackle 
agrarian disorder.16 There was strong opinion within government circles that 
force alone was not going to be enough (there was always the likelihood that 
sustained activity by the Special Infantry Corps would aggravate unrest.)'7 Thus 
in March 1923 the Free State government took its first legislative steps towards 
11 Agricultural statistics of Ireland with detailed report for the year 1917 [Cmd 1316], 
H.C. 1921, xli, p. xiv. 
12 Report of the proceedings of the Irish Convention [Cd 9019], H.C. 1918, x. 697; 
memorandum on land bill of 1920, n.d. (N.A.I., DT S1995A). 
13 Historians remain at variance regarding the nature, role and extent of agrarianism during 
the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War. For various opinions see Paul Bew, 'Sinn 
F6in, agrarian radicalism and the War of Independence' in D. G. Boyce (ed.), The revolution 
in Ireland, 1879-1923 (Dublin, 1988), pp 217-35; Charles Townshend, Political violence in 
Ireland: government and resistance since 1848 (Oxford, 1983); Joost Augusteijn, From 
public defiance to guerrilla warfare: the experience of ordinary volunteers in the Irish War 
of Independence, 1916-21 (Dublin, 1996); J. M. Regan, The Irish counter-revolution, 
1921-36 (Dublin, 1999); Peter Hart, 'Definition: defining the Irish revolution' in Joost 
Augusteijn (ed.), The Irish revolution, 1913-1923 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp 17-33; Terence 
Dooley, 'I.R.A. veterans and land division in independent Ireland, 1923-48' in Fearghal 
McGarry (ed.), Republicanism in modern Ireland (Dublin, 2003), pp 86-107. 
14 Memorandum by Patrick Hogan on land bill of 1920 (N.A.I., DT S1995); Ddil 
Eireann deb., iv, 1983-4 (8 Aug. 1923). 
15 Patrick Hogan to W. T. Cosgrave, 7 Apr. 1923 (N.A.I., DT S3192). 
16 [Patrick Hogan], 'Seizures of land' (copy memo), 22 Dec. 1922 (N.A.I., DT S1943); 
Department of Defence memorandum, 1 Feb. 1923 (M.A., A/7869). 
17 See, for example, M.A., files A/8506, A/7869, A/613, detailing activities of the 
Special Infantry Corps, resistance to the same in certain areas, its success in quelling 
agrarianism, and so on. 
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the restoration of rural law and order with the enactment of the Enforcement of 
Law (Occasional Powers) Act and the District Justices (Temporary Provisions) 
Act.'8 
The Enforcement of Law Act was passed to undo the paralysis that had 
adversely affected the executive machinery of the courts. It was intended to 
tackle those 'people taking advantage of the political and national situation, 
withholding payment to their neighbour for value received, withholding money 
due in various forms, whether through debts, rents, Land Commission annuities, 
or in any other form'.19 With bailiffs granted increased powers, landlords began 
to resort to the courts to have their rents paid. This put the new government in an 
invidious position; it could hardly be seen to favour the old landed class over the 
new order. If landlords were granted the opportunity to press for arrears or evict 
their tenants, the new government was likely to be accused of being no different 
to British governments in the past. 
In January 1923 the first tentative steps had been taken towards the formulation 
of a new land bill as a matter of 'importance and urgency'.20 Agrarian grievances 
could only be addressed by the completion of land purchase and the compulsory 
acquisition and attendant redistribution of lands. Ostensibly the government 
recognised the precarious nature of its position and, knowing that legislation 
promising to complete land purchase and initiate compulsory land acquisition 
and redistribution might negate the popular support of the republicans and initiate 
a return to law and order, determined to press ahead with the introduction of a 
land bill. 
If this land bill was to solve the land question in Ireland once and for all, it 
should have been very carefully formulated. It possibly was not - and this 
observation is not intended as a reflection upon the abilities or intentions of those 
who formulated it but rather upon the extreme complexities of the issues with 
which the bill had to deal and which would have required much longer than a few 
months' deliberation and planning (although, of course, few bills are actually 
afforded such a luxury). While Hogan was aware that it was unlikely to be the 
last land bill introduced to the Dail,2l he hardly envisaged it would be followed 
by a dozen or so more over a forty-year period. It seems that the socio-political 
climate of the time dictated that it would have to be pushed through before the 
impending general election on 27 August 1923. In the aftermath of the Land 
Purchase and Arrears Conference of 10-11 April that had been established in an 
attempt to negotiate common ground between landlords and tenants, Hogan had 
announced to the government the mood of a significant proportion of the 
electorate: 
They [the tenant representatives] informed the landlords in all moods and tenses that a 
great change had come; that they [the landlords] were now in a small minority, and an 
unpopular minority; that they [the tenants] could take the land from them for nothing if 
they wished; that the people meant to have the land cheaply, and that if the present 
18 Enforcement of Law (Occasional Powers) Act, 1923 (1923, no. 4) (1 Mar. 1923); 
District Justices (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 (1923, no. 6) (27 Mar. 1923). 
19 Kevin O'Higgins, Minister for Home Affairs, Ddil Eireann deb., ii, 971 (19 Jan. 
1923). 
20 Ibid., ii, 592 (5 Jan. 1923). 
21 Ibid., iii, 1147-8 (28 May 1923). 
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government did not meet the wishes of the people in this respect, they would put in a 
government the next time who would.22 
The formal introduction of the land bill to the Dtiil in May 1923 coincided with 
the ending of the Civil War and may very well have significantly contributed to 
the decline in support for the anti-treatyites' agrarian campaign. In a powerful 
speech Kevin O'Higgins, the Minister for Home Affairs, warned against 
recalcitrance: 
Within the last year, under cover of activities against the Government, men have gone out 
in an entirely selfish, wilful and criminal spirit to seize land by the strong hand, or by the 
hand which they thought was strong ... [I will urge] on the Minister for Agriculture from 
my department, that the people who go out in that spirit, who go out in the defiance of the 
law and in defiance of the Parliament to press their claims by their own violence and their 
own illegalities be placed definitely outside the benefits of this Bill.23 
Daiil rhetoric during the debate astutely emphasised that the introduction of the 
bill marked the end of the agrarian revolution, the beginning of which was dated, 
with some justification, to 1870. In many respects, deputies from all parties were 
attempting to create something of a legacy for themselves: they, the first 
constituent members of a national parliament since the passing of the Act of 
Union, would, as one deputy forcefully put it, 'dispose of the last remnant of Irish 
landlordism'.24 
On 8 August 1923 President W. T. Cosgrave introduced a special resolution to 
both houses of the Oireachtas: 
.. during the last two or three years a good deal of dislocation of the ordinary 
administration has been attributable to the land agitation ... This is a Bill on which the 
maximum amount of agreement has been brought to bear by all the parties to it ... But I 
think the general consensus of opinion in the Oireachtas and in the country is that the 
measure is one that will go far towards making for much more peaceful conditions and 
much more ordered conditions and for greater security and greater stability than perhaps 
any other measure we have had under consideration here. We consider that the public 
peace is ensured by the passing of this Bill.25 
Cosgrave's speech was strongly suggestive of the fact that the bill would have 
a more salutary effect than even the Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Acts 
passed the same month.26 The introduction of such a special resolution could 
have caused a great deal more controversy than it did had its terms not 
specifically excluded the bill from the referendum clause of Article 47 of the 
1922 constitution.27 Was the bill really that necessary as a means of ensuring 
public peace, or was it more of a political expediency at a crucial time in the 
22 Patrick Hogan, Report on the Land Purchase and Arrears Conference of 10-11 Apr. 
1923, dated 17 Apr. 1923 (U.C.D.A., Blythe papers, P24/174). 
23 Ddil tireann deb., iii, 1161-2 (28 May 1923). 
24 Ibid., cols 1147-8, 1153. 
25 Ibid., i, 1983-5 (8 Aug. 1923). 
26 An act to provide for the preservation of public safety and the protection of persons 
and property and for matters connected therewith or arising out of the present emergency 
(1923 no. 28) (1 Aug. 1923); An act to make provision for the immediate preservation of 
the public safety (1923 no. 29) (3 Aug. 1923). 
27 See Darrell Figgis's questioning of the legitimacy of the resolution, Ddil iireann deb., 
iv, 1985-6 (8 Aug. 1923). 
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genesis of the new state, or more particularly in the consolidation of the Cumann 
na nGaedheal party as the party of government? If the referendum clause was not 
bypassed, the bill could technically have been suspended for ninety days, which 
would have given landlords the time to follow through on the thousands of writs 
that allegedly had been processed during the previous months. This could 
possibly have had disastrous electoral consequences for the government in the 
general election fixed for 27 August. Back in April, Hogan had urged upon 
Cosgrave the necessity of an immediate introduction of the land bill before 
landlords began to issue writs for arrears of rent that would cause 'a very big 
row'.28 If the bill was enacted, all arrears of rent up to the final gale day in 1920 
would be immediately cancelled, all those accruing from that gale day to the one 
preceding the passing of the act would be compounded at 75 per cent of the total, 
and no proceedings against tenants for the recovery of arrears could be begun or 
continued after the passing of the act. It therefore made good political sense to 
have it enacted before the general election. 
The special resolution was passed by both houses and the 1923 land bill passed 
into law on the following day, 9 August.29 In the long term, this act and those 
which followed would redesign the social structure of Irish rural society; in the 
short term, it contributed to the return to more peaceful ways in the Irish 
countryside at least as much as any other legislative measure introduced by the 
Free State government in the first eight months of 1923. 
II 
The 1923 Land Act has primarily been associated with the completion of land 
purchase that had been begun by the British land purchase acts.30 It was, however, 
much more significant than a mere facilitator of the completion of land purchase. 
In its very ambitious attempt to solve the land question once and for all, it gave 
the newly constituted Land Commission31 powers to carry out the compulsory 
acquisition and redistribution of land. It recognised that the completion of land 
purchase was only one stage in the solving of the land question; the other stage, 
which was much more complex and would remain intractable, was the relief of 
congestion. 
Post-independence agrarian grievances were underpinned by the prevalence of 
uneconomic farms throughout the country. Traditionally there has been a sense 
that these farms were concentrated almost exclusively along the western 
seaboard or in the so-called 'congested districts areas' that had been designated 
28 Memorandum on 1923 land bill prepared by Patrick Hogan for W. T. Cosgrave, 18 
Apr. 1923 (N.A.I., DT S3192). 
29 An act to amend the law relating to the occupation and ownership of land and for other 
purposes relating thereto (1923 no. 42) (9 Aug. 1923). 
30 See, for example, Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p. 606; Murphy, Ireland in the 
twentieth century, p. 65; Fanning, Independent Ireland, p. 73; Jackson, Ireland 
1798-1998, p. 283. 
31 Land Law (Commission) Act, 1923: an act to amend the law relating to the Irish Land 
Commission and to dissolve the Congested Districts Board for Ireland and transfer its 
functions to the Irish Land Commission and for other purposes connected therewith (1923 
no. 27) (24 July 1923). 
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under the 1891 land act as necessitating remedial rural development, particularly 
with regard to the reform of land structure. However, at independence an average 
of around 65 per cent of all agricultural holdings in each of the counties outside 
the designated congested areas came under the definition of 'uneconomic' as set 
out by the Land Commission, that is, below £10 valuation or roughly 20 acres of 
'reasonable' land.32 The simultaneous existence of a variety of other interested 
social groups including the landless, evicted tenants or their representatives and 
I.R.A. veterans who felt that their contribution to the independence struggle 
entitled them to farm grants ensured that agrarian issues were certainly not going 
to go away. And, of course, with the recent extension of the franchise in 1918, 
these groups had all assumed increased electoral importance. Inevitably there 
was the temptation to manipulate land reform for political purposes because local 
and national politicians quickly came to realise that no other issue was as 
important to the rural mindset. 
Thus no other state body was as important to rural Ireland as the reconstituted 
Land Commission. After 1923 it became the principal agent of social engineering 
in modern Ireland, and it may not be an exaggeration to claim that its impact on 
Irish rural society was matched only by that of the Catholic church. The 
commission had two main functions: first, to complete the transfer of tenanted 
lands by providing state funds for the purpose of vesting these holdings in the 
tenant purchasers as owners in fee simple subject to terminable land purchase 
annuities; second, to divide and redistribute land through the acquisition of 
untenanted estates (and later on holdings resumed from those who had purchased 
under previous land acts) and their division into appropriate parcels among 
selected allottees, either for the enlargement of uneconomic holdings or for the 
provision of new holdings for persons specified as being entitled to the same 
under the Free State / Irish Republic land acts. 
In respect of the completion of the transfer of proprietorship, the sheer scale of 
the financial burden that the 1923 act placed upon the state and its willingness to 
carry that burden is stark evidence of the perceived importance of the land 
question to contemporaries. In May 1923 Patrick Hogan estimated that it was 
going to cost the state up to £30 million to complete land purchase at a time when 
the country was 'only just emerging from an atmosphere of unreason and 
irresponsibility'.33 This money could only be raised through a loan from the 
British government.34 In a Ddil speech in 1925 Hogan put the scale of the 
operation into perspective for his fellow T.D.s: 
It is an enormous loan, when compared with ordinary development, say, with the 
development of the Shannon, a gigantic scheme, but at the outset which is only going to 
cost about five million pounds. Thirty million pounds for land purchase is a very 
expensive matter, very much more expensive than any other.35 
As it happened, the completion of land purchase and division under the 1923 
act cost considerably more. Professor David Seth Jones, whose recent work on 
land reform in independent Ireland has begun to challenge traditional doctrine, 
32 Report of the Estates Commissioners for the year from 1 April 1920 to 31 March 
1921, p. vi. 
33 Ddil Eireann deb., iii, 1147 (28 May 1923). 
34 Ibid., x, 1544 (26 Mar. 1925). 
35 Ibid. 
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has provisionally set the figure at £58 million, a truly colossal figure for the 
implementation of any social policy, and this was really only the proverbial tip of 
the iceberg because subsequent land legislation cost considerably more.36 The 
need to seek such a huge loan from Britain in order to begin the process in 1923 
- which Hogan believed was necessary to stabilise the countryside and thereby 
attract future long-term investment37 - undoubtedly constrained the political 
ambitions of Cumann na nGaedheal and, indeed, their expenditure in other areas 
of social policy. 
But it was in the area of acquisition and division that the Land Commission 
impacted most upon the majority of families living in rural Ireland. By the time 
it published its final report in 1987 over 1.5 million acres had been acquired and 
redistributed under the various land acts from 1923, while another 840,000 acres 
acquired under previous land acts (for which the Land Commission became 
responsible after 1923) were also divided. This gives a total of 2.34 million 
acres. Given that there was at most 11.6 million acres of agricultural land in the 
twenty-six counties (that is, the area under crops, pasture and grazing), this 
represents a very significant 20 per cent of farmland affected by acquisition and 
division.38 If the 3 million acres vested in the new proprietors is taken into 
consideration (the difficulty here being that some of this area may also be 
included in the acquisition and division figures if farms were resumed by the 
Land Commission), this brings the total to almost 50 per cent of agricultural 
land subjected to Land Commission interference. Perhaps more significantly, 
114,000 families benefited from having their holdings vested in them, while 
another 134,000 families (at least) benefited from enlargements, new holdings 
or accommodation plots, and so on. This represents a total of 248,000 families. 
It is difficult to put this figure into perspective, given the fluctuating numbers 
employed in agriculture over the extended period from 1923 to 1987, but, for 
example, in 1946 (the last census year before the end of the period covered by 
this paper) the total rural population was around 1.12 million persons, of which 
just under 250,000 were returned as farmers.39 Furthermore, for the years for 
which statistics are available (1937-78), the Land Commission migrated over 
14,500 farmers on to lands totalling over 382,000 acres." In total, 54 per cent of 
the area acquired by the Land Commission in Kildare and 54 per cent in Meath 
was allotted to such migrants.41 
Add to these figures the thousands of families who lost land through 
compulsory acquisition (not only landlords, but also many large farmers who had 
purchased their holdings under the British land acts),42 and it becomes very clear 
36 I would like to acknowledge Professor Jones's generosity in sharing his findings with 
me. 
37 Ddil Éireann deb., iii, 1150-51 (28 May 1923). 
38 Statistical abstract of Ireland, 1962 (Pr 6571), pp 68-9. 
39 Census of population of Ireland, 1946 (1949, P 9225), i, 18; ii, 10, 154-9. 
40 Reports of the Irish Land Commission, 1937-78; P. J. Sammon, In the Land 
Commission: a memoir, 1933-1978 (Dublin, 1997), pp 260-61. 
41 Department of Lands memorandum for the government: 'Review of Land 
Commission policy', July 1957 (N.A.I., DT S16265). 
42 One of P. J. Sammon's very interesting statistical appendixes hows, for example, that 
170 (former) landlords had almost 238,500 untenanted acres acquired between 1923 and 
1936 alone (Sammon, In the Land Commission, pp 264-78). 
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that after 1923 the working of the Land Commission impacted positively or 
negatively on the vast majority of farmers in independent Ireland. If further 
evidence is required, it might be worth noting that in the 1940s the Land 
Commission secretariat, which dealt with Land Commission correspondence, 
was receiving in excess of 400,000 letters per annum.43 
It was actually the Land Commission's interference with proprietorial security 
that made it for many the 'bogeyman' of rural Ireland, particularly after the 
passing of the 1933 and 1946 land acts." The acquisition and division of farms 
became a notoriously divisive issue, pitting neighbour against neighbour. As late 
as 1971 Jim Tully (Meath, Labour) told the Daiil: 
I ... think it is wrong that too much emphasis is put on the information given to a Land 
Commission inspector by people other than the applicant. There is a tendency on the part 
of everybody whose job it is to get information to go to a neighbour for information about 
a particular person. This is wrong. The applicant should be allowed to make his own case 
and to stand or fall on that case. Let him look for recommendations if he wants to but let' 
us not have the situation where some of his neighbours who do not like him can put in a 
'spoke' to try to prevent him from getting something to which he is morally entitled.45 
It pitted the rights of the western migrants against local inhabitants in eastern 
counties such as Meath, leading to a great deal of local tension. At one stage in 
the late 1930s these tensions culminated in ugly street riots in Athboy, County 
Meath, as locals vented their anger towards 'land-grabbing' migrants.6 Around 
the same time S. J. Waddell (who had joined the Land Commission in 1909 and 
had risen to the position of land law commissioner by the mid-1920s) wrote in 
the introduction to his play Bridge Head (written under the pseudonym 
Rutherford Mayne): 'To deal justly with those who have to give up their land so 
necessary for the relief of the congests, to allot this land equitably to the 
numberless applicants and to install the migrants in the teeth of what is often 
determined and strenuous opposition, is not an easy task.'47 In the actual play 
itself, one of his characters, a local man, informs the Land Commission inspector 
who has recently arrived in the area to divide an estate: 'You'd be wise to be 
putting no migrant up into that country. Begor the Rising that was in [nineteen] 
sixteen will be nothing to what's coming on yous if you plant strangers up in that 
bedlam.'48 Even more frightening was the factual case of the Land Commission 
inspector who received a death threat from a dissatisfied applicant who had been 
overlooked in favour of a migrant.49 And he was probably not the only one. 
43 H. J. Monahan, 'Administration of land acts' in E C. King (ed.), Public 
administration i Ireland (Dublin, 1945), p. 141; see figures above regarding population 
and farm households at this time. 
44 See David Seth Jones, 'Land reform legislation and security of tenure in Ireland after 
independence' in Eire-Ireland, xxxii-xxxiii (1987-8), pp 116-43. 
45 Ddil Fireann deb., cclvi, 509 (28 Oct. 1971). 
46 Ibid., lxxvii, 938 (8 Nov. 1939). 
47 Rutherford Mayne [S. J. Waddell], Bridge Head (Dublin, n.d.), p. v. 
48 Ibid., p. 3. 
49 Meath Chronicle, 27 Apr. 1935. 
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III 
During the 1920s and 1930s no other social issue was as important to political 
survival - not only that of individuals but also that of parties - as land division. 
Land became 'good business politically'. From 1923 to 1948 very few received 
land unless they were members of Fianna FHil cumainn or Cumann na nGaedheal 
/ Fine Gael clubs." A few examples will here suffice. In December 1924 John 
Lyons (Longford-Westmeath, Independent Labour) was under no illusions as to 
why Cumann na nGaedheal introduced the 1923 Land Act: 'You had the Land 
Act introduced for the purpose of election propaganda ... in order to safeguard 
the position in 1923 by getting a big majority for the government.'51 In 1929 F. J. 
Carty (Leitrim-Sligo, Fianna FHiil) claimed that 
When land is being divided in my constituency, it is not the most deserving applicants that 
secure allotments. The principal key-men and supporters of Cumann na nGaedheal 
invariably receive first preference ... Prominent followers of Cumann a nGaedheal were 
brought, some of them a distance of three or four miles, and given land at Raughly on the 
Gore Booth estate; while the claims of other small landholders and fishermen were 
ignored. Quite recently when land was being divided on the Mitchell estate near Dromore 
West, the local Cumann a nGaedheal secretary was brought in from an outside estate and 
given a section of these lands, to the exclusion of more deserving applicants including 
those who formerly obtained conacre tillage there.52 
After Fianna FAil took office in 1932 it was now the turn of the Fine Gael-led 
opposition strenuously to attack the government's land division policy. In July 
1936 James Dillon (Donegal, Centre Party) declared in the Diil: 
The Deputy [Mr Davin] knows as well as I do that Fianna Faiil T.D.s have been called down to discuss with local Fianna Fiil cumainn the distribution of land in a particular 
parish; that they have gone down and let it be widely known that at the cumann meeting 
over which they were presiding a discussion took place as to the division of so-and-so's 
land, and that Deputy so-and-so is going to use his influence - that is the phrase - to get 
that land divided.53 
Davin did not refute the allegations. 
Two further examples are enlightening, even though one of them falls outside 
the time constraints of this article. In 1945 Oliver J. Flanagan (Leix-Offaly, 
Monetary Reform) admitted in the Daiil that some years previously he had been 
secretary of his local Fianna Fiil cumann when an estate known as Robinsons of 
the Rock was being divided. A Land Commission inspector allegedly called to 
Flanagan's home and informed him that he 'was the first man in that district that 
he had received instructions from the minister [for lands] to come to because I 
was secretary of the Fianna FHil club'. In the subsequent scheme of division, 
Flanagan claimed that 'on every occasion the applicant's political affiliations 
were investigated' and concluded: 
I would not be speaking with a clear conscience if I did not openly admit hat, when I was 
secretary of a Fianna Fiil club, I saw the most corrupt and the most disgraceful things 
50 Terence Dooley, 'The land for the people': the land question in independent Ireland 
(Dublin, 2004), pp 201-27. 
51 Ddil Eireann deb., ix, 2591 (12 Dec. 1924). 
52 Ibid., xix, 665-6 (18 Apr. 1929). 
53 Ibid., lxiii, 1969 (24 July 1936). 
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done to keep individuals out of land that I have ever known in all of my years of public 
life.54 
Up to the late 1950s it was practice for inspectors to set out in the official list 
of applicants for allotments of lands, the names of the persons who were 
recommending these applicants. In 1957 Erskine Childers, then Minister for 
Lands, directed that this practice should cease. Ambiguously, he argued that the 
practice had not influenced the Land Commission in drawing up their final lists 
of allottees. If that was the case, why ban it? Furthermore, during the speech in 
which he advocated that the practice should cease, he attempted to draw attention 
to the ineffectiveness of the process: 
In one typical estate, 11 applicants who had not solicited recommendations were 
successful as compared with only five who had solicited recommendations. In another 
case, nine were successful without representations as compared with only two on whose 
behalf representations were made. In yet another case, six were successful without 
representations as compared with only three who had solicited recommendations.55 
Surely a success rate of 38 per cent (and no doubt one grossly understated) 
among those who had representations made on their behalf speaks for itself. At 
any rate, Childers decided to alter radically the practice of representations. In his 
first Department of Lands estimate speech in 1957 he informed the Diil that he 
would be sending a letter to all T.D.s to remind them that the selection of allottees 
was an excepted matter over which the Minister for Lands had no control. P. J. 
Sammon, a principal officer in the Land Commission at the time, maintains that 
this new situation lasted only a matter of weeks: 'The Fianna Fail T.D.s were up 
in arms and following a party meeting, the minister was forced to drop this 
approach and to revert to the status quo ante.'56 
Obviously it was important for T.D.s to create the impression that they had 
significant influence over the decisions reached by the Land Commission with 
respect to local acquisitions and divisions. It made good political sense to be seen 
to be supporting the claims of their constituents. The most solid indicator of this 
was the amount of time spent on land-related debates and questions in the Daiil. 
The present author has looked at almost 8,500 land-related references in the Ddil 
debates for the years 1923-73. The majority of references (5,300, or 62 per cent) 
were for the period from 1923 to 1939, an average of 312 per calendar year. And 
of the 5,300, the bulk of these (almost 75 per cent) were questions put by 
individual T.D.s relating to the acquisition and division of lands in their 
constituencies. This number, it should be added, does not take into consideration 
the fact that in numerous instances a T.D. in a single question would inquire about 
the possibility of the division of a dozen or more estates in his/her constituency 
which, if enumerated as separate references, would greatly multiply the total. 
Proportionately more time was spent on discussing land issues than any other 
single issue from 1923 to 1939, with the exception of constitutional reform for a 
period in the 1930s (but, of course, after the constitution was enacted in 1937, the 
land reform question remained active for another forty years). The annual vote on 
the Land Commission estimates from 1923 to 1948 consistently attracted 
contributions from the majority of deputies in the Dail who represented rural 
54 Ibid., xcvi, 2456 (25 Apr. 1945). 
55 Ibid., clxvi, 158 (24 Apr. 1957). 
56 Sammon, In the Land Commission, p. 126. 
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constituencies. (In general, the city-based T.D.s stayed aloof from such debates; 
J. J. Byrne (Dublin North, Cumann na nGaedheal) announced in the Diil in 1928: 
'I did not intend to take any part in this debate at all, for I always considered that 
the city man knows very little about land.')57 On 24 July 1924, so much time was 
spent on the issue of land division that Major Bryan Cooper's (County Dublin, 
Independent) only contribution to the debate was to 'remind the Daiil that there 
are some thirty votes yet to be discussed'.58 
While it is easy to be cynical about T.D.s' motives, methods and success rates, 
at the same time it would be foolish to underestimate the actual significance of 
political manoeuvring in the determination of land division schemes. As we shall 
see below, pressure could be exerted by a local community through a Fianna Fail 
cumann or a Cumann na nGaedheal branch that would have been extremely 
difficult for a Land Commission inspector to counter. 
IV 
The very policy of the Land Commission and its implementation at local level 
opens up a range of issues that cannot possibly be dealt with in an article of this 
length but which require attention elsewhere. For example, what light might the 
investigation of the land question in independent Ireland throw upon the complex 
issue of voting patterns? Fianna Fail certainly recognised at an early stage the 
importance of land division to its prospective electoral success. Back in the 1880s 
when the home rule movement merged with the land movement the merger gave 
the former a much greater national impetus. This was a fact not lost on Eamon de 
Valera, who, at the Fianna Faiil ard-fheis in October 1931, said that 
he remembered a great deal of argument as to whether the movement for Home Rule was 
being advanced or retarded by linking up with the fight for the land. There was [now] a 
certain linking up because it was thought that by doing so there would be brought to the 
national movement a support which it might not otherwise get.59 
The fifth plank of Fianna Faiil's policy as enunciated at its inaugural meeting in 
April 1926 - 'to establish as many families as practicable on the land'60 - is 
not only the one of most relevance here, it was also the one that appealed most 
to the small farmers and agricultural labourers who were more concerned with 
improving their standards of living than, for example, achieving a thirty-two- 
county Ireland. In ideological terms, Fianna FKil, by promoting this policy, 
regarded itself as following in the tradition of Sinn Fdin and the first Daiil 
Eireann.61 In more practical terms, Fianna Fail was creating a power base in rural 
57 Ddil tEireann deb., xxiii, 88 (18 Apr. 1928). 
58 Ibid., viii, 2189 (24 July 1924). 
59 Irish Press, 29 Oct. 1931. 
60 Richard Dunphy, The making of Fianna Fdil power in Ireland, 1923-1948 (Oxford, 
1995), p. 83. 
61 Frank Aiken, for example, would later claim that 'One of the principal objects for 
which Fianna Fail was founded was to establish on the land as many families as 
practicable. This was also one of the fundamental objects of the old Sinn F6in 
movement and of the First Ddiil.' See Ddil Eireann deb., xlviii, 2381 (13 July 1933); 
also corrected typescript copies of a speech by Frank Aiken introducing the 1933 land 
bill to Ddil Eireann, Aug. 1933 (U.C.D.A., Aiken papers, P104/3301). 
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constituencies that was founded on numerical strength. Socio-economic and 
cultural objectives were, therefore, very much tied to a land policy whose key 
aims were: to settle as many families as was practicable on the land; to keep them 
there (as aspired to in the 1937 constitution) in economic security and free from 
privation; to maintain economic self-sufficiency through a tillage programme 
that was suited to a small-farm economy (which by extension meant getting rid 
of the graziers); and to promote the type of idyllic rural culture as espoused by de 
Valera. 
By the early 1930s, essentially because of competition for votes, Fianna Fail 
cumainn and Cumann na nGaedheal / Fine Gael clubs were organising their 
members and presenting applications on their behalf to the Land Commission. 
Most of the preliminary inquiries about future estate divisions were probably 
made discreetly at political gatherings, in the local pubs and political clinics, at 
funerals, weddings and a variety of other local community events. These 
organisations then kept a close eye on developments, particularly when an 
inspector arrived in an area. The establishment of clubs and cumainn gave a 
formal structure to the lobbying process. In 1927, for example, the Fianna Fail 
ard-fheis recommended that 
cumainn should pay special attention to the work of supplying their teachta( [T.D.s] with 
reliable information concerning matters of local importance, of which they should be 
acquainted. Persons wishing teachtaf to take action on their behalf should be encouraged 
to approach them through the cumainn.62 
In 1937 the president of the Dunboyne Fianna Fa il cumann in Meath referred 
to the recent division of a 600-acre estate in the area: 
If Fianna Fail members got more land than people who were not members it was because 
the local cumann looked after the interests of its members. It saw that the claims were put 
forward in an intelligent way and submitted to the Land Commission in a proper manner.63 
In turn, the officers of the local cumainn, it seems, were adequately catered for in 
local land division schemes for their contribution to the party. In November 1946 
de Valera wrote a most revealing letter to Patrick Moroney in Limerick, who had 
just completed some valuable organisational work on the party's behalf: 
I have yours of October 21st and am glad to note that you will have the local cumann 
registered as soon as possible. I have taken up the question of a further allotment for you 
with the Minister for Lands and you may be assured of my best efforts on your behalf.64 
Meanwhile Cumann na nGaedheal's relationship with the electorate (or at least 
with some of the 40 per cent or so of it who had given their first preferences for 
the pro-treaty party in the 1922 and 1923 elections) had been soured by the slow 
progress of land acquisition and division. Its continued protection of the large- 
farmer interest did not endear it to the more numerous smallholders. P. W. Shaw 
(Longford-Westmeath, Cumann na nGaedheal) alleged in the Diil in 1927 that 
62 Fianna Fdil: second annual ard-fheis, 1927: report of proceedings, p. 5 (U.C.D.A., 
P176/741). 
63 Meath Chronicle, 16 Oct. 1937. 
64 'Ard rninal' to Patrick Moroney, 25 Nov. 1946 (U.C.D.A., P176/62 (67)). According 
to the Fianna Faiil research office, Eamon de Valera held this position within the party at 
this time, and the letter was undoubtedly sent by him. 
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the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation had lost almost forty branches in County 
Westmeath as a result of the party not delivering on its land division policies 
there.65 Indeed, by the early 1930s Cumann na nGaedheal was being accused of 
not delivering on its land division policies anywhere. From 1923 to 1932 the 
Land Commission had acquired almost 331,000 untenanted acres and 
redistributed them to almost 16,600 allottees (excluding lands previously 
acquired by the estates commissioners and the Congested Districts Board). An 
annual average of almost 37,000 acres acquired and redistributed to an average 
of 1,844 allottees may seem impressive enough, but it was by no means sufficient 
to satisfy land-hungry contemporaries. 
In many ways Cumann na nGaedheal rhetoric on the 1923 Land Act had been 
much more revolutionary in its expressed intent than was the actual process of 
acquisition and redistribution of lands during its term of office. Compulsory 
acquisition was not to apply to certain categories of property: lands purchased 
under previous land purchase acts or at that stage subject to a prior purchase 
agreement that had not been finalised; lands which were residential or formed 
part of a demesne, home farm,66 park, garden or pleasure ground; untenanted 
lands purchased under the 1869 Irish Church Act for less than £2,000; untenanted 
lands which had potential as building ground; lands held in trust for the state or 
government departments; and, finally, glebe lands which were in the occupation 
of 'ecclesiastical persons'. 
The exceptions, in theory at least, benefited to some extent the remnants of the 
old landed class, allowing them to retain the trappings of demesne lands and the 
untenanted lands which some of them had sold and repurchased under the terms 
of the 1903 Irish Land Act. These safeguards were undoubtedly a gesture to the 
British government; in 1925 Patrick Hogan had told the Ddiil that the British 
government, during negotiations regarding the financing of the act, had 'made no 
secret that they have the interests of the landlords at heart'.67 The 1923 act made 
two further significant exceptions: untenanted lands which were stud farms and 
'untenanted land which is intermingled with woodland . . . the acquisition of 
which would be detrimental to the preservation of woodland and to the interests 
of forestry' could not be acquired.68 Few of the great houses in Ireland did not 
have demesnes which had untenanted lands intermingled with woodland. 
Regarding stud farms, this exception was understandable at the time, for the 
equine and horseracing industry was growing in importance and the government 
was well aware of the need to continue to promote it. But this exclusion also 
offered an opportunity to many of the great landowners of the past to continue to 
hold on to untenanted lands by establishing stud farms. In some cases these stud 
farms operated in name only; in other cases they were quite successful. By the 
late 1920s Lord Dunraven's Fort Union Stud at Adare was highly successful, as 
was Charles Moore's stud at Mooresfort in Tipperary; the Marchioness 
Conyngham established a stud at Slane, Sir Gilbert Greenall continued breeding 
65 Ddil tireann deb., xxii, 889 (7 Mar. 1927). 
66 'A farm used for the convenience or advantage of the owner's residence and in 
connection therewith and not merely as an ordinary farm for the purposes of profit' (Land 
Act, 1923). 
67 Ddil Eireann deb., x, 1544 (26 Mar. 1925). 
68 Land Act, 1923. 
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horses and pedigree cattle at Kilmallock in Limerick, and Lord Mayo established 
an extensive stud farm at Palmerstown.69 
The exceptions listed in the 1923 act also benefited the large farmers who had 
bought out their holdings under the terms of the British land acts and who formed 
the main support basis for Cumann na nGaedheal. If the Land Commission were 
to take up purchased lands (hereafter referred to as vested lands, for they had 
already been vested in the Land Commission under previous land purchase acts), 
the proprietor had to be provided with a new holding which 'in the opinion of the 
Land Commission ... shall be equally suitable for the said proprietor or tenant 
and of not less value than the declared land'.70 Furthermore, the Land 
Commission would not compulsorily acquire land from an owner 'so long as 
there [was] other unacquired land in the same locality suitable for relieving 
congestion which [did] not come within the exceptions'."71 If the owner of a parcel 
of untenanted land vested in the commission had worked it 'as an ordinary farm 
in accordance with proper methods of husbandry', and it was not required for the 
purposes of enlargement or the relief of congestion, he was allowed to repurchase 
it from the commission providing that the vested parcel plus other lands in his 
ownership did not exceed £3,000 in value. 
Similarly, if the commission acquired land from an individual, it could also 
purchase demesne or other land in his possession adjacent to the acquired land 
and then resell it to the owner 'as if he were a person to whom advances might 
be made for the purchase of a parcel of land under this act'.72 While all the 
excepted lands, other than those held in trust for the state or government 
departments, could be vested in the Land Commission if it decided they were 
required for the relief of congestion, the commission rarely brought this into play 
during the administration of Cumann na nGaedheal from 1923 to 1932. It is 
worth noting that from 1923 to 1932 the Land Commission resumed 106 farms 
with a total acreage of 21,555 acres, while it resumed 542 farms totalling 72,700 
acres during Fianna Fiil's administration from 1932 to 1948.73 The annual 
average rate of acquisition under Fianna Fail was, therefore, almost three times 
as great as that under Cumann na nGaedheal; the annual average acquisition in 
terms of acreage was almost twice as much; and the average size of farms 
acquired fell from 203 acres under Cumann na nGaedheal to 134 acres under 
Fianna FAil. 
It has reasonably been argued that one of the main reasons for the decline of 
Cumann na nGaedheal in the early 1930s was its commitment to the large farming 
class in its perceived attempt to maintain Ireland 'as an agricultural appendage of 
the U.K. economy'.74 It is true that the party had done very little to attract the 
support of the small farming classes or the landless, and less still to stem the rising 
tide of poverty in rural Ireland. The transfer of proprietorship was much slower 
69 F F. MacCabe and T. E. Healey, 'Racing, steeplechasing and breeding in Ireland' in 
Charles Richardson (ed.), British steeplechasing (London, 1927), pp 294-6; Terence 
Dooley, The decline of the big house in Ireland: a study of Irish landed families, 
1860-1960 (Dublin, 2001), pp 267-8. 
70 Land Act, 1923. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Extracted from Reports of the Irish Land Commission, 1923-48. 
74 Dunphy, Rise of Fianna Fdil, p. 21. 
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than anticipated. Demands for additional lands from small farmers and lands for 
the landless agricultural labourers had not been met as had been anticipated. 
Credit was largely unavailable to either group - they did not have the necessary 
collateral to secure loans - while large farmers benefited from the facilities of the 
Agricultural Credit Corporation established in 1927. Small farmers could not hope 
to expand or even improve their holdings (no subsidies, for example, were 
available for pig farming, an integral part of the small farming economy),75 and 
agricultural abourers, whose wages were actually declining during the 1920s, had 
obviously very little hope of purchasing lands on the open market. 
Furthermore, Cumann na nGaedheal's limited protection of Irish industry and 
its continued promotion of pastoral agriculture over tillage had contributed 
towards an increase in emigration levels once again in the 1920s.76 Cumann na 
nGaedheal, therefore, alienated the support of the small farming communities, 
particularly in the west. These communities began to look for alternative 
representation, and so looked increasingly towards Fianna Fiil. 
In the lead-up to the 1932 general election Fianna Faiil promised a 
revolutionary programme of land acquisition and division. In power, Fianna 
Fail's majority was dependent upon the support of Labour and was too tenuous 
to introduce the radical type of land legislation that was necessary. How much of 
a coincidence was it that in January 1933 de Valera called a snap general election 
after the party had clearly publicised the fact that the expediting of land 
acquisition and division was dependent upon a new land act? No fewer than 
seven resolutions (out of a total of forty-five) passed at the Fianna F iil ard-fheis 
in November 1932, for example, related to land acquisition and division and the 
working of the Land Commission.77 
In the general election that followed in January 1933 Fianna Faiil captured an 
extra five seats, giving it a safe overall majority. In 22 out of the 25 rural 
constituencies Cumann na nGaedheal's share of first-preference votes had 
declined rather dramatically, in fourteen of them by at least 10 per cent. Its losses 
were greatest in western constituencies such as Donegal, Clare, Galway, 
Leitrim-Sligo, Roscommon and Mayo North and South where Cumann na 
nGaedheal had been unsuccessful in relieving congestion; in the east-midland 
counties of Longford-Westmeath, Louth, Meath and Carlow-Kilkenny and the 
south-midland county of Tipperary, where large grazier and dairy farms 
continued to exist; and in the border counties of Monaghan and Cavan, where 
there was a very high concentration of smallholders clamouring for more 
economically viable holdings. In 24 out of the 25 constituencies (Cork West 
being the exception) Fianna Fail candidates secured a higher percentage of first- 
preference votes than their Cumann na nGaedheal opponents (an average of 48.2 
per cent to Cumann na nGaedheal's 28.3 per cent). In 17 out of the 25 
constituencies Fianna Fail's share of first preferences over Cumann na nGaedheal 
was in excess of 20 per cent. Again, these were constituencies where land 
acquisition and division most likely played a key role in determining election 
results: Cavan, Clare, Cork East, Cork North, Donegal, Galway, Kerry, 
75 Ibid., p. 204. 
76 Enda Delaney, Demography, state and society: Irish migration to Britain, 1921-1971 
(Liverpool, 2000), p. 60. 
77 Fianna Fdil: seventh annual ard-fheis 1932: report of proceedings (U.C.D.A., 
P176/746). 
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Leix-Offaly, Limerick, Longford-Westmeath, Louth, Mayo North, Mayo South, 
Meath, Monaghan, Roscommon and Tipperary.78 
The 1933 Land Act79 provided the Land Commission with more draconian 
powers regarding the compulsory acquisition of lands and allowed for the 
compulsory acquisition of purchased farms as well as untenanted estates, with 
limited restrictions. Patrick Hogan attacked the 1933 bill, with some justification, 
as being 'a purely political' one, pandering to the small-farmer and labouring 
classes in an attempt to secure votes.80 Land League-type rhetoric characterised 
the opposition's attack on the bill's contents, which the opposition claimed 
threatened tenurial security. In 1936 James Dillon (elected for Donegal as a 
Centre Party T.D. in the 1933 election) told the Daiil: 
Hitherto, the Land Commission has been looked-up to by the people as their friend and 
champion as against the landlords. It is now becoming an infinitely worse landlord than 
Clanricarde ever was. You shake the confidence of the people in the personnel of the Land 
Commission if you make the Land Commission appear in the minds of the people as a 
menace and a threat to their fixity of tenure; you are going irretrievably to injure the Land 
Commission as a power for good in this country and that would be a great disaster.81 
After 1933 farmers had to live with the fear that the Land Commission might 
resume their holding if it was large enough to be needed for the relief of local 
congestion, or if a land-hungry neighbour reported that it was not being worked 
in a satisfactory manner, or if the farmer fell on hard times and was unable to 
repay his annuities owing to any one of a variety of causes such as economic 
depression, illness or infirmity. It was a disturbing fact, as Professor George 
O'Brien told the Banking Commission in 1935, that 
The question of whether a person will continue in possession of his holding at the present 
time in the last resort depends on the opinion of some official guided by some policy 
regarding the utility or otherwise of the type of agriculture he is pursuing.82 
More crucially, the 1933 Land Act should perhaps be viewed in light of the 
stimulus it gave to the growth of the Blueshirts. The exact nature of the role of 
the wider land question in the rise of the Blueshirts has not yet been satisfactorily 
elucidated. Historians are in agreement that the movement was dominated by 
large farmers and graziers who were determined to protect their interests from the 
full rigours of de Valera's tariff war with Britain.83 The significance of the 
78 Statistical information drawn from B. M. Walker (ed.), Parliamentary election results 
in Ireland, 1918-92 (Dublin, 1992). 
79 An act to amend generally the law, finance and practice relating to land purchase, and 
in particular to make further and better provision for the execution of the functions of the 
judicial and lay commissioners of the Land Commission and to provide for the provisions 
of the purchase annuities and certain other annual payments and for the funding of arrears 
thereof, and to provide for other matters connected with the matters aforesaid (1933 no. 
38) (13 Oct. 1933). 
80 Ddil tireann deb., xlviii, 2396 (13 July 1933). 
81 Ibid., Ix, 715 (3 Feb. 1936). 
82 Commission of enquiry into banking, currency and credit: memoranda and minutes 
of evidence, ii (1938), p. 1164. 
83 See Mike Cronin, 'The socio-economic background and membership of the Blueshirt 
movement, 1932-1935' in I.H.S., xxix, no. 114 (Nov. 1994), p. 239; Paul Bew, Ellen 
Hazelkorn and Henry Patterson, The dynamics of Irish politics (London, 1989), p. 52. 
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'economic war' to the growth in the Blueshirt movement is accepted, but it is also 
worth considering to what extent the threat to the proprietorial security of large 
farmers posed by the 1933 Land Act contributed to this growth. 
In his analysis of the socio-economic backgrounds of a sample of Blueshirts 
(admittedly a small one), Mike Cronin has found that the majority came from 
families with under sixty acres who, he concludes, could not be classified as large 
farmers. However, his upper threshold in this case is too high; in the early 1930s 
sixty-acre farms were actually almost three times the size of the standard Land 
Commission holding, which means that they were, in fact, considered very large 
farms at the time which could be targeted for resumption and redistribution if 
they were deemed necessary for the relief of congestion. In fact one-third of 
Cronin's sample owned in excess of ninety-one acres. The largest influx of 
members to the Blueshirts occurred between 1932 and 1934, with recruits 
pouring into their ranks in 1933, the year that Fianna Fdiil introduced its first land 
act, a measure that threatened the proprietorial rights of the large farmers much 
more than the previous Free State land acts had done." 
When the terms of the 1933 act became effective, the rate of acquisition and 
division increased dramatically. For the year ended 31 March 1935 an 
unprecedented 102,000 acres of untenanted lands were divided among 6,244 
allottees.85 In the following year the achievement was even greater: 104,000 acres 
among 7,712 allottees. For the first five-year period of Fianna Fail's 
administration (ending 31 March 1937) almost 353,000 acres were divided 
among 25,802 allottees, over 100,000 acres more than in the preceding five-year 
period. Hardly surprisingly, Cumann na nGaedheal, defending the proprietorial 
rights of large farmers, argued that Fianna Fail's radical land acquisition and 
redistribution policy was tantamount o 'the purest of communism'.86 
Similarly, Cronin was surprised to find that 'counties such as Meath and Mayo 
where there was an absence of large landowners . . . saw big upturns in 
membership' of the Blueshirts in the early 1930s.87 There may have been a 
numerical absence of large landowners, but the bulk of the land in these counties 
was held by substantial proprietors whose holdings were targeted by Fianna Faiil 
after 1932 for acquisition and redistribution, in Mayo for local congests, in Meath 
for those migrants who would be moved from the west. By 1982, when the Land 
Commission's work of acquisition and division had effectively ended, 637 
untenanted estates or purchased holdings had been acquired by the Land 
Commission in Meath (totalling 52,657 acres) and 1,573 in Mayo (totalling 
48,828 acres). Mayo had the highest number of holdings acquired/resumed in the 
country, while Meath was in fifth place. Meath had the second-highest acreage 
acquired/resumed, while Mayo had the third-highest (both behind Galway).88 It 
is quite possible that the threat of the acquisition of their estates drove many of 
the large landowners from these counties into the Blueshirts. 
When the record acquisition and division statistics could not be matched after 
1936 for a variety of reasons, not least of which was the uriavailability of large 
84 Cronin, 'Blueshirt movement', pp 237-8. 
85 Report of the Irish Land Commission, 1934-5, p. 5. 
86 Ddil tireann deb., xlix, 937 (1 Aug. 1933). 
87 Cronin, 'Blueshirt movement', p. 239. 
88 Report of the Irish Land Commission, 1981-2, pp 10-11. 
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untenanted estates, another bout of disillusionment, frustration and 
disappointment engulfed the small farmers of the west. In the 1937 general 
election Fianna Fiil support there fell by 8 percentage points from its 1933 level. 
This was hardly coincidental, yet it has not been highlighted. Similarly, when 
land acquisition and division was temporarily halted during the Emergency, 
Fianna Fail support in the west plummeted to 43 per cent in the 1943 election, 
which represented a fall of 18 percentage points from 1933. 
Another fall-out of Fianna Fiil's failure to deliver on its promises of land division 
was the establishment of Clann na Talmhan in 1938. While the Clann claimed to 
have other agendas besides the land question, it was essentially upon this issue that 
its initial success was based. In the 1943 general election Clann na Talmhan secured 
ten seats: one in Cavan, one in Cork North, one in Cork West, one in Donegal East, 
one in Galway East (where its founder, Michael Donnellan, topped the poll), one 
in Kerry North, two in Roscommon, one in Tipperary, and one in Wicklow.89 The 
successful candidates' share of first-preference votes cast ranged from 5.5 per cent 
in Tipperary to Donnellan's 25.6 per cent in Galway. In Roscommon the two 
successful candidates took 31 per cent of the total first preferences. In Kerry North 
the successful Clann na Talmhan candidate took 13.6 per cent of the first 
preferences, with his running-mate, who narrowly missed out on election, taking 
another 13 per cent. In Cavan, Cork North, Cork West and Wicklow the Clann 
candidates took an average of 15.6 per cent of first preferences." This election was 
to mark the high point of the party's electoral success. 
V 
A characteristic post-war desire for change initiated a shift away from Fianna 
Fiail for a variety of reasons already set out by historians, including inter alia a 
serious balance-of-payments deficit in 1947, disillusionment that the post-war 
economy was not improving, a disastrous winter in 1947, a serious energy crisis 
as coal supplies from Britain were curtailed, and perhaps popular reaction to 
Fianna Fiil's growing arrogance, the need to demonstrate that power was 
revocable and that Ireland would not be turned into a one-party state.91 However, 
historians have failed to consider another crucial element in this shift - the 
party's ultimate failure to deliver upon its pre-1932 promises of land division. 
Furthermore, the 1948 general election was fought amidst huge controversy 
that surrounded the terms of the 1946 Land Act that gave powers to the Land 
Commission to resume holdings from allottees who had not farmed them to the 
satisfaction of the Land Commission. Most of these holdings had been given to 
landless men in record numbers during the early years of Fianna Fiil's 
administration.92 With little experience of running farms, and even less capital, 
89 Information extracted from Walker (ed.), Parliamentary election results, 1918-92, pp 
154-61. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See, for example, J. A. Murphy, 'The Irish party system, 1938-51' in K. B. Nowlan 
and T. D. Williams (eds), Ireland in the war years and after, 1939-51 (Dublin, 1969), p. 
158; Townshend, Ireland: the twentieth century, p. 159. 
92 Sedin Moylan to de Valera, 1 Sept. 1943 (N.A.I., DT S12890); Moylan to Lemass, 5 
May 1944, quoted in W. E Nally to PAdraig 0 Cinndide, 16 May 1944 (ibid.). 
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many of these allottees floundered as farmers, having succumbed to the ravages 
of economic depression and the calamitous effects of a prolonged 'economic 
war' with Britain. Fianna FAil, by threatening to take back forcibly lands that it 
had allotted, was acting in a way that was tantamount to evicting tenants during 
the land war of the 1880s. Just as galling for the small farmers of the west was 
the fact that by 1948 Fianna Fail was beginning to play ball with the large farmers 
and the ranchers. In June 1948 Bernard Commons (Mayo South, Clann na 
Talmhan) claimed that Fianna Fail's proposed land division policy in 1932 had 
assured it of the support of the majority of small farmers in the country and the 
hostility of every rancher, but in the interim in his constituency 
slowly and surely ... the position changed and, in 1948, in the constituency which I 
represent I found that 99.9 per cent of the ranchers of the locality were loyal and 
enthusiastic supporters of the Fianna Fail Party and that 95 per cent of the uneconomic 
holders were up in arms against the Fianna Falil Party because of their failure to provide 
them with what they wanted.93 
It is also true that by this stage certain influential members of Fianna F ail had 
come to recognise the negative impact that the complete break-up of large farms 
could have on the Irish agricultural economy if land acquisition and division was 
to continue on the pre-Emergency scale.94 Setin Moylan as Minister for Lands 
(1943-8) advocated the decelerating of land acquisition and division and 
promoted the gradual movement away from traditional Fianna Fail land division 
policy. In 1944 he wrote to Sedn Lemass: 'Some people hold the view that the 
greater number of acres of land divided the greater the success. I don't hold that 
view. The creation of records has resulted in ill-advised schemes the evils of 
which are now apparent.'95 
Moylan, Lemass and many of their contemporaries were aware that small-farm 
life could no longer be painted in idyllic terms; harsh reality had intervened in the 
form of reports by agricultural experts and experienced members of the Land 
Commission.96 In 1945 a committee (appointed three years earlier to consider 
agricultural policy in the aftermath of the Emergency) under the chairmanship of 
Professor T. A. Smiddy reported that 'the prosperity of the agricultural industry 
in this country will depend in the future, as it has done in the past, on intensive 
production of livestock and livestock products and on the disposal of a large 
proportion of such products in the export market' and recommended the 
expansion rather than the contraction of the livestock market.97 
In 1947 the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning argued that the small 
standard farms of £20 poor law valuation (or twenty-five acres of good land) 
were 'only subsistence holdings which add little to the agricultural wealth of the 
country, provide little or no exportable surplus and allow no appreciable cash 
93 Ddil Eireann deb., cxi, 352-3 (3 June 1948). 
94 Committee of enquiry on post-Emergency agricultural policy: reports on agricultural 
policy, 1945 (1945, P 7175), pp 84-5. 
95 Moylan to Lemass, 5 May 1944, quoted in W. E Nally to Pddraig 0 Cinndide, 16 May 
1944 (N.A.I., DT S12890). 
96 For a fuller discussion see Dooley, 'The land for the people', pp 121-31. 
97 Committee of enquiry on post-Emergency agricultural policy: reports on agricultural 
policy, 1945 (1945, P 7175), pp 84-5. 
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margin'. These holdings were now deemed uneconomic.98 There was a clear 
change in political thinking here, for the committee argued that to divide 200- 
acre farms into holdings of less than thirty acres had no lasting effect: 'Quite 
apart from any other result, at the first opportunity these small holdings will tend 
to coalesce once more under the force of economic attraction.'" The highly 
influential Department of Finance similarly argued that before any further 
reduction in the small number of large farms now left in the country was brought 
about 'the possible repercussion on the agricultural economy as a whole should 
receive exhaustive examination'." Finance further suggested that the Land 
Commission should not acquire any more land for division except in the 
congested districts.101 
Some Fianna Faiil traditionalists now acknowledged that in a country where so 
many smallholdings had been created, it was necessary to preserve the remaining 
large farms in the richer agricultural areas to provide a market for the cattle 
produced in the poorer agricultural lands of the west and south.102 But the 
proposed abandonment of Fianna Faiil's traditional land policy was not well 
received among the less well-off small-farming community and undoubtedly had 
a negative impact upon the party's fortunes at the polling booths in 1948. When 
returned to power in 1951, Fianna Fail kept the portfolio for lands in the hands 
of traditionalists such as Thomas Derrig (1951-4) and Michael Moran 
(1959-68), who both favoured a land reform policy that focused upon acquisition 
and division. 
VI 
This article has argued that Irish society remained animated by land issues long 
after independence. The completion of land purchase under the 1923 Land Act 
was not the final solution to a land problem that essentially had more to do with 
the economic viability of farms than peasant proprietorship. For that reason 
compulsory land acquisition (attempted only on a very limited basis before 
independence) and division came to dominate Irish rural society for much of the 
twentieth century. 
This effectively meant that the reconstituted Land Commission became the 
most important (and controversial) government body operating in independent 
rural Ireland. It acted as a facilitator of social engineering, compulsorily 
acquiring lands from traditional landlords, large farmers, graziers and negligent 
farmers and passing it on to smallholders, former employees of acquired estates, 
evicted tenants and their representatives, members of the pre-truce I.R.A. and the 
landless. It moved over 14,500 farmers on to lands totalling over 382,000 acres. 
Yet despite the enormous impact of the Land Commission upon Irish society for 
98 Department of Lands memorandum for the government on land division policy, Apr. 
1947 (N.A.I., DT S6490B/1). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Department of Finance memorandum for the government on land division policy, 28 
Nov. 1948 (ibid.). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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well over half a century, readers will search in vain in all the standard textbooks 
for anything more than the most cursory reference to it.103 
The type of agrarian violence that had characterised pre-independence Ireland 
may have dissipated after 1923; however, social unrest was never far below the 
surface as rural society remained in a state of continual flux where some people 
lived with the hope that the government, through the working of the Land 
Commission, would improve their social and economic situation by giving them 
more land, while others lived with the fear and the insecurity that the commission 
might compulsorily acquire their land. Thus the continued hunger for land in 
independent Ireland, allied to the impact of land acquisition and division on so 
many people, ensured that the land reform question remained one of the most 
potent political issues at both local and national level right up to the early 1980s. 
Very often it led to political success or determined political demise. 
While the merging of the land question with the national question in the 
nineteenth century guaranteed the former a pivotal position in Irish 
historiography up to independence, it remarkably has not featured in the 
historiography of the post-independence era. In the light of the evidence 
presented here, it would make for an interesting study to examine how this came 
to be, although, as stated in the introduction, one suspects that the anomalous 
position of the Irish Land Commission records and the difficulty in gaining 
access to these is to a large degree responsible.104 
TERENCE DOOLEY 
Department of History, National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
103 See above, pp 175-6 and n. 3. 
104 I should like to express my gratitude to the National University of Ireland for 
allowing me the opportunity as Postdoctoral Fellow in the Humanities to carry out the 
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